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Summary:
Previous studies show mixed results concerning the effects of market
structure on advertising intensity. Some argue that monopolies would
spend more on advertising than oligopolies while others take the opposite
position. Using data which avoids many of the problems encountered in
previous investigations, this study concludes that duopolies incur higher
sales promotion expenditures per sales unit than monopolies. However,
as the size of the firm increases, this relationship is reversed because
of the decline in the marginal production of advertising.

An Assessment of The Effect of Competition
on Advertising Intensity
By: Walter J. Primeaux, Jr.*
Economists have studied advertising's effect on business for
many years. Through the years these studies have covered subjects
as diverse as the appropriateness of advertising by a business firm
and the welfare losses caused by advertising. Chamberlin is given
credit for introducing selling costs into rigorous theoretical analysis
and later economists introduced statistical and econometric analysis
to examine some important empirical questions concerning advertising
and selling expenditures.
Because of the complex interaction between sales and advertising,
the empirical studies have not answered once-and-for-all the many ques-
tions examined by researchers. One important issue which has not been
settled concerns the effect of market structure on advertising inten-
sity. That subject is the main focus of this study.
2
*I thank Julian Simon for helpful comments on an earlier version
and Randy Nelson, Len Nichalls, and Andy Jaski for research assistance.
Two of the earliest studies are: E. F. Meade, "The Place of
Advertising in Modem Business," Journal of Political Economy , Vol. 9,
March 1901, pp. 218-42 and S. A. Sherman, "Advertising in the United
States," Journal of the American Statistical Association , Vol. 7,
December 1900, pp. 119-62.
2
Although others had discussed or mentioned advertising in
earlier writings Ben B. Seligman, Main Currents in >todern Economics,
New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, pp. 721-72 4 says that
Chamberlin "...made a most important contribution to modem theory
by translating selling outlays into cost curves, whicn were then
superimposed onto production costs. References to the role of selling
costs could be found in the writings of other economists. . .but in
Chamberlin' s work they were given greater analytic precision."
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I. The Importance of Market Structure and Advertising
Advertising may be the cause of changes in market structure and
at the same time is a decision variable which could be affected by
3
market structure. Advertising may be a substitute for price rivalry
and it has value to a firm in helping to avoid competition. It may
be that economic pov/er is gained by using advertising as a competitive
weapon and the large outlay for advertising may constitute a deterrent
to entry of new competition into an industry. Consequently, advertising
may affect concentration in an industry.
Previous studies show mixed results concerning the effect of market
structure on advertising intensity. Some argue that monopolies would
spend more on advertising than oligopolies while others take the oppo-
site position. Using data from the electric utility industry this study
concludes that market structure differences do affect advertising expen-
ditures. The results show that duopoly firms incur higher sales expen-
ditures than monopolists.
II. Previous Studies
There is an abundance of economic literature concerning advertising
and market structure. Simon explained that he had found only two theo-
retical statements concerning the effects of market structure on adver-
tising expenditures and they took different positions. Telser expected
3
Julian L. Simon, Issues in the Economics of Advertising , Urbana:
University of Illinois, 1970, pp. 218-241.
^Ibid.
J. S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition
,
Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1956.
^Ibid.
blmon, op. cit.. n . oi
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an inverse relationship between concentration and advertising and
explained that "...firms that have some monopoly power are more likely
to advertise because they can obtain most of the increased sales stim-
Q
ulated by this advertising." Marshall takes an entirely different
position.
...When the production is all in the hands of one
person or company, the total expenses involved are
generally less than would have to be incurred if
the same aggregate production were distributed among
the multitude of comparatively small rival producers.
They would have to struggle with one another for
the attention of consumers, and would necessarily
spend in the aggregate a great deal more on adver-
tising ig all its various forms than a single firm
would. .
.''
Since the extensive literature concerning various aspects of market
structure and advertising has been previously well reviewed by Orienstein,
11 12
Ferguson and Comanor and Wilson only a few studies of direct interest
to this study will be discussed here.
10
Lester G. Telser, "Advertising and Competition," The Journal of
Political Economy , Vol. LXII, December 1964, p. 551, cited in Ibid., p. 93,
9
Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics . Ninth Variorium Ed.,
New York: Macmillan, 1961, p. 484, cited in Ibid.
S. I. Orienstein, Industrial Concentration and Advertising
Intensity
,
Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1977.
James M. Ferguson, Advertising and Competition; Theory,
Measurement, Fact
,
Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974.
*l\^illiam S. Comanor and Thomas A. Wilson, Advertising and Market
Power, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.
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Comanor and Wilson explained that "we should expect advertising
to be very low in markets in which a larger number of small firms produce
a relatively homogeneous product. As concentration increases in such
an industry, previously external benefits become internalized; under
the conditions of monopoly, they are fully internalized. Hence, for
relatively homogeneoxis products we should expect a positive relation
13
between concentration and level of advertising." Consequently,
Coniancr and vvilson would expect advertising to decrease as competition
increases.
Kahn explained that, in the utility business, separate gas and
electric companies, because of competitive pressure in a single city,
would be expected to spend more on advertising than a single monopolist.
He presents empirical results which tend to support this belief but
14
called for further hard evidence concerning this question.
Collins verified the higher expenditures of separate gas and
electric companies mentioned by Kahn. He found significantly higher
promotion and selling expenses for electric companies facing competi-
tion from gas companies under different ownership. These results are
consistent with those presented by Wilder.
•"^Ibid., p. 144.
14
Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation , vol. II., New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971, p. 279.
William H. Collins, "Comparative Performance of Combinations and
Separately Managed Electric Utilities," Southern Economic Journal , Vol. 40,
July 1973, p. 87.
R. P. Wilder, "Public Utility Advertising: Some Observations,"
Land Economics, Vol. 49, November 1973, p. 462.
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Simon cites empirical evidence to support the proposition that
advertising decreases as competition decreases. He explains "on most
assumptions two sellers will together spend a sum for promotion greater
than a monopolist."
Telser, in two separate empirical studies, foimd the relationship
between advertising intensity and concentration to be unimportant. '
He concludes, "there is little empirical support for an inverse associa-
tion between advertising and competition, despite some plausible theorizing
20
to the contrary."
The studies discussed above, as well as those presented in the
Comanor and Wilson and the Orienstein studies, report conflicting results
and theoretical expectations. This study further examines market struc-
ture effects on advertising expenditures using data which have not been
used previously.
III. The Theoretical Model
As mentioned earlier, this study uses data from the electric
utility industry. Each firm of interest operates in a single city
and is municipally owned. The theoretical model, therefore, applies
to electric utility firms. There are certain underlying factors and
Julian L. Simon, "The Effect of Competitive Structure Upon
Expenditures for Advertising," Quarterly Journal of Economics , Vol.
LXXXI, November 1967, pp. 610-627.
18
Lester G. Telser, "Advertising and Competition," op. cit.,
pp. 541-551, 558.
19
Lester G. Telser, "Another Look at Advertising and Concen-
tration, "__j£ujmal_of__Indusrria^^ Vol. XVIII, November 1969,
p. 93.
20
Telser, "Advertising and Competition," op. cit., p. 558,
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characteristics of the electric utility business, and of firms operating
in this business, which affect their need and desire to advertise and
promote sales. A firm in this business, as in any other, would be
expected to adjust advertising expenditures so as to gain the greatest
benefit from that activity.
Municipally owned electric utility firms operate in a single city
21
and typically operate as monopoj.ists. As monopolists, their advertising
objective is somewhat different from the typical business firm. There
is less emphasis on defensive advertising and the use of appeals designed
to attract customers from a rival, but more interest in stimulating over-
22
all consvunption and the use of advertising of a public relations nature.
The variables, discussed below, are the important determinants of adver-
tising expenditures for electric utility firms.
SCALE
For two reasons, the scale of the business could affect advertising
expenditures for the type of electric utility firms included in the
sample. First, one might expect this result because of resource avail-
ability and second because of the need and opportunity for more adver-
tising as markets become more complex. As the scale of a firm grows,
it has more financial power to use for advertising purposes. That is,
firms of larger size have more discretionary financial resources which
21
As will be explained later, the empirical portion of this
paper does refer to communities where there is direct electric utility
competition. The conditions facing a competitive firm is essentially
the same as those facing a monopoly firm, except for the regulatory
effects which are discussed below.
22
This has changed, to some extent, because of the energy shortage.
However, for the time period of interest to this study, this explanation
is valid.
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they can dedicate to advertising than a smaller firm which must direct
njore of its resources toward its basic financial requirements. More-
over, as markets grow larger, there is a greater need and opportunity
to benefit from more advertising. Bigger markets provide more targets
for advertising and increase the probable yield from a given expendi-
23
ture. Because of the conditions discussed above, one would expect
a larger firm to expend a greater relative amount for advertising than
a smaller firm.
Sales Growth
Sales growth is another important variable affecting advertising
expenditures. If sales are growing, one would expect a higher level of
advertising activity than if conditions were static or the reverse condi-
tions existed. So, if sales are not growing, a lower lever of advertising
24
would be expected.
Geographical and State Location
Advertising expenditures would be affected by the location of a firm.
These effects would be caused by two unrelated environmental conditions
influencing the firm's behavior. First, geographical location causes
weather differences which affect the promotional activities of the firms.
Second, the regulatory effect.
23
The diverse arguments concerning expectations of returns to
advertising are reviewed in Simon Issues in the Economics of Advertising
op. cit., pp. 301-310.
Among the studies employing sales growth as an Important variable
are: Douglas Greer, "Advertising and Market Concentration," Southern Economic
Journal, July 1971, and John Cable, "Market Structure, Advertising Policy and
Intermarket Differences" in Market Structure and Corporate Behavior , K. Cowlin
(ed.) London: Gray Mils, 1972.
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Firms located in different regions of the country would be ex-
pected to spend different amounts for advertising because of the
specific promotional opportunities existing in those different areas.
For example, firms located in the south enjoy greater opportunities
to increase electricity use by promoting air conditioning than would
firms in the north, where summer temperaturas and hunddity levels are
more moderate.
If firms face regulatory constraints which restrain or prohibit
advertising activities, these would also restrict advertising levels.
The state regulator^/ commissions would either encourage or discourage
firms from advertising because of their enforcement of commission regu-
lations concerning advertising. These regulations vary from state to
state.
Time Trend
For several reasons, advertising levels for electric utility firms
might be expected to be influenced by time. Through time, the satura-
tion levels for different major home appliances has increased. Conse-
quently, one result could be that a firm would increase expenditures to
encourage consumer interest in other energy using items such as outdoor
26
lighting. At the same time, it covild be that as saturation increases,
there is a reduced need for a firm to advertise because consumer load
has been built up to an acceptable level through time. Under this notion.
25
As discussed later, since then energy crisis firms have largely
discontinued encouraging and promoting additional usage by consumers. How-
ever, for the period of this study, this type of activity was quite common.
O
f.
As mentioned in footnote 22, the data included in this study
preceded the energy shortage.
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advertising might be expected to decline through time. Because of
these complications and the lack of knowledge as to which effect would
dominate, it is not possible to say how time would affect advertising
expenditures.
Market Structure
A monopoly firm would advertise less than a firm facing competi-
27 28
tion. As Marshall and Simon explain, competition in products or
services causes a firm to compete for the attention of consumers and
this condition would force a larger aggregate expenditure for advertis-
29
ing than in the monopoly case,
IV. Methodology
The primary objective of this study was to determine if differences
in market structure affected advertising intensity. The statistical
approach used was ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis
with equation in the form: '
Y = A + B.Time + B^Scale + B.Growth + B.Dcom + B^X^ + B^X, +
1 2 3 4 5566
•••
^is-'^is*
27
Marshall, op. cit.
28
Simon, (1967), op. cit.
29
P. Doyle, "Advertising Expenditure and Consumer Demand,"
Oxford Economic Papers
.
N.S. Vol. 20, November 1968, pp. 398-413 in-
cludes some additional items in his theoretical model. He explains
that promotional costs are affected by the type of product sold by
the business. Durable vs. non-durable goods would require different
advertising expenditures as would low priced vs. high priced items.
Different price elasticities of demand among products sold would also
affect advertising expenditures. These elements are either controlled
for by the data and sample included in this study or by the nature of
the product involved in the empirical phase of this study.
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Where: Y = sales expense per 1000 residential KWE, a measure
of pronotional intensity
Time = a time trend variable
Scale = nvimber of residential customers
Growth = percentage change in residential KITE sales, a
sales growth variable
Dcom = a competition dummy variable, 1 if duopcly, if
monopoly
X^ to X-_ = state dummy variables
The sample was composed of municipally owned electric utility firms.
The profit orientation of these firms has been established in a previous
30
study. One may be inclined to think that promotional outlays are not
significant for firms in this business; however, as a percent of revenue,
these costs are comparable to transmission costs. This does not mean that
promotional expenses are as significant in the electric utility industry
as in some other businesses but it does reveal that they are as important
31
as other costs thought to be important.
30
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr., "A Reexamination of the Kinky
Oligopoly Demand Curve," Journal of Political Economy , July-August,
1974, pp. 851-862.
31
For each year from 1963 through 1968, promotional expenses
for municipal electric utilities averaged 1.1 percent of revenue.
During that same period municipal untilities spent 1.0 percent of
revenue for transmission costs in 1963; 1.2 percent in 1964 and 1965;
and 1.3 percent in 1966, 1967 and 1968. The percent of revenue spent
on promotion by these municipally owned electric utility firms, equals
or exceeds the amount spent for advertising by a number of industries,
including m.eat, sugar, millinery, furs, periodicals, motorcycles and
bicycles, and motor vehicles. Moreover, the expenditure for a number
of other industries barely exceeds the utility expenditure. These
industries include knit goods, men's clothing, furniture, tires and
tubes, and footwear. See Comanor and Wilson, op. cit., pp. 134-135.
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Promotional intensity, which is the dependent variable, was
measured as the sales expense per kilowatt hours (in terms of mills)
.
This is a measure of the total promotional outlay, and it has the
advantage of avoiding some of the difficulty in measuring advertising
intensity mentioned by Telser, He explains that in some industries
there is a wide dispersion of the advertising intensity among companies;
some companies using high advertising intensity, selling one type of
drug product and those with low intensities selling another type. As
mentioned earlier, Telser explains that "It would be better to relate
32
the concentration ratio to the total promotional intensity." '' That
is the data used in this study; total selling expenses includes adver-
tising and all promotional expenditures. Consequently, problems caused
by failure to include some promotional costs are avoided.
The sample was selected from firms presented in Statistics of
Publicly Owned Electric Utilities in the United States
,
1948 through
1968. The most recent year was 1968 because of the concern that more
recent data would be significantly affected by price level changes.
Moreover, in later years, firms discontinued promoting the use of
33
electricity, because of the energy shortage.
32
Telser, "Another Look at Advertising and Concentration,"
op. cit., p. 9A.
33
Two studies explaining that data more recent than 1968 wotild
reflect unsettled conditions for making comparisons are: Walter J.
Primeaux, Jr., "Rate Based Methods and Realized Rates of Return,"
Economic Inquiry , Vol. XVI, January 1978, p. 98, and P. C. Mann and
J. L. Mikesell, "Tax Payments and Electric Utility Profits," The
Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 38, July 1971, p. 71.
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The sample consisted of two different kinds of firms. One subset
consisted of municipally owned monopoly electric utility firms serving
only a single city. These firms are clear monopoly firms protected
from competition from another electric firm.
The second subset consisted of firms from electric utility duopolies.
In some cities there are two electric utility firms and a municipal firm
faces rivalry from a privately owned firm and direct competition exists.
The competition faced by firms in this sample is direct in that custc-ers
have a choice of buying electric service from either the municipally owned
firm or the privately owned firm.
Privately owned firms usually operated in more than one city.
Data for these firms are published as aggregate firm data without
34
allocations of cost, revenue, or expense data to particular cities.
Since the privately owned firms did not face competition in all cities
in which they operated, it was not possible to determine the appropriate
selling expense allocation for any particular city; thus, these firms
35
were useless for this study.
34
The nature of this electric utility competition as well as
the impossibility of using the data from the privately owned firm from
each electric utility duopoly is discussed in Walter J. Primeaux, Jr.,
"A Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Structure for Electric Utilities,"
in Almarin Phillips ed.. Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets
,
Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1975.
35
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr., "The Effect of Competition on
Capacity Utilization in the Electric Utility Industry," Economic
Inquiry
,
Vol. XVI, April 1978, and Walter J. Primeaux, Jr., "An Assess-
ment of X-Efficiency Gained Through Competition," Review of Economics
and Statistics
,
Vol. LIX, No. 1, February 1977.
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To make a determination of the effect of market structure differ-
ences on selling expenses intensity it was necessary to compare firms
in monopoly market structures with firms in duopoly market structures.
Since the privately owned firms did not allocate sales expenses to the
competing cities, it was decided that the focus would be on municipally
owned firms only. One subset of the sample consisted of the municipally
owned firm from the duopoly markets. The second subset was composed of
3 6
firms which were also publicy owned but monopolists.
There are only a limited nimiber of cities in which electric utility
competition exists. Consequently, members of the competitive part of
the sample were largely determined by the mere existence of competition.
All competing firms did not file reports with the Federal Power Commission;
therefore, data in Statistics of Publicly Owned Utilities in the United
States do not include all firms. Moreover, some firms combined sales
expenses with other expenses so that data were useless for this study.
Consequently, the competitive subset of firms included all of those for
which data were available. Matched monopoly firms were selected for
comparison purposes. Matched monopoly firms were selected because they
37had been determined to be suitable in previous studies.
The procedure provided for an assessment of the levels of sales
expenses among firms in the same industry, comparing duopoly and mono-
poly markets. Firms in the sample sold a homogeneous product, produced
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr., "A Reexamination of the Monopoly Market
Structure...," op. cit. In all cases of interest to this study, a munic-
ipally owned firm competed with a privately owned firm. Because of the
problem mentioned above, privately owned firms could not be included. So
municipally owned monopolies and duopolies are compared.
37
See footnote 35.
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a single product, and sold in a single city. Therefore, the sample
avoids many of the problems mentioned in previous studies. The sample
consists of thirty-four firms, thirteen from duopoly markets and twenty-
one from monopoly markets. Time series and cross section data were
38
pooled to add strength to the sample. All firms did not report usable
data for the whole 1948-1968 time period covered for the study. Con-
sequently, the number of sample observation is not even for the whole
sample. So linear interpolation was used to calculate numbers to be
39
used for missing data.
The whole sample size was 350 consisting of 123 duopoly observations
and 227 monopoly observations. The firms included from the monopoly and
duopoly subsets are listed in Table I.
V. R.egression Results
Table II presents the equation for estimating advertising intensity
in the electric utility industry. The table reveals that the signs on all
variables for which there is theoretical basis conform to expectations;
the variables [in the equation (1) , without interaction variables] explain
approximately 41 percent of the variation in promotional expenditures and
the variables [in the equation (2) with interaction variables] explain
approximately 47 percent of the variation.
38
Klein says "The pooling principle is [a means] of enlarging our
sources of basic information." See: Lawrence R. Klein, A Textbook of Econo-
metrics, New York: Row, Petersen, 1956, p. 237. This technique was used in
Primeaux, "An Assessment of X-Efficiency Gained Through Competition," op. cit,
39
These interpolations were used only for data for the growth
variable, not for all data. All other data were complete.
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TABLE I
LOCATION OF MUNICIPAL UTILITY FIRMS
INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE
Duopolies Years of Data N=
Bessemer, Alabama
Tarrant City, Alabama
Anchorage, Alaska
Ft. Wayne, Indiana
Maquoketa, Iowa
Hagerstown, Maryland
Bay City, Michigan
Dowagiac, Michigan
Ferrysburg, Michigan
Lincoln, Nebraska
Piqua, Ohio
Springfield, Oregon
Traverse City, Michigan
1950-1968 19
1962-1968 7
1958-1968 11
1948-1950, 1953, 1955-1968 18
1965-1968 4
1943-1953, 1962-1968 13
1948, 1959-1962, 1964-68 10
1966-1968 3
1966-1968 3
1948-1963, 1966-67 18
1954-1960, 1966-68 10
1957-60, 1962-68 11
1948-50, 1952, 1964-68 9
136*
Monopolies Years of Data N=
Florence, Alabama 1949-1968 20
Scottsboro, AlabaiDa 1962-1968 7
Richmond, Indiana 1948-1968 21
Algona, Iowa 1962-1968 7
Springfield, Illinois 1948-1968 21
Anderson, Indiana 1956, 1958-1964, 1966-1968 11
Logansport, Indiana 1951-1952 2
Lansing, Michigan 1948-1968 21
Niles, Michigan 1948-1951, 1953-1960 12
Sturgis, Michigan 1966-67 2
Wyandotte, Michigan 1959-62 4
Carthage, Missouri 1960-61, 1966-68 5
Columbia, Missouri 1962, 1967-68 3
Rolla, Missouri 1950-1968 19
Springfield, Missouri 1948-63 16
Omaha, Nebraska 1961-1968 8
Eugene, Oregon 1949-1968 20
Greenwood, South Carolina 1964-1968 5
Watertown, South Dakota 1949-52, 1954-58, 1960,
1963, 1965-68 15
San Antonio, Texas 1948-68 21
Bristol, Virginia 1961-68 8
248*
*The sum of 136 plus 248 is 384; however, the sample actually consisted
of 350 observations, because 34 data points were used to compute differences
used for the GROWTH variable.
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Variable
CONSTANT
TIME
SCALE
DCOM
GROWTH
DALAB
DALAS
TABLE II
LESSION RESULTS
Equation (1) Equation (2)
.2250
(3.4277)^
.1465
,
(2.1436)"
.0010
(.3043
.0015
(.3727
.000003
(3.3296)^
.000005
(4.5076)^
.0900
(1.70793)''
.3512
(2.8878)^
.0249
(.6754)
.0149
(.4153)
-.1837
,
(-2.7452)''
-.1909
(-2.9335)^
.0054
(.04536)
-.0294
(-.2528)
DILLI
DINDI
DIOWA
DMARY
DVIRG
DMISSO
DNEBR
.4120
(4.5177)'
.0584
(.8775)
.2238
(1.7797)'
1.1892
(10.6464)'
-.0720
(-.5146)
-.2135
(-2.8899)
.0893
(.9730)
.4619
(5.2290)*
.2247
(3.0519)'
.2304
(1.8963)
1.2183
(11.1429)'
-.0134
(-.0981)
-1.5911
(-2.2026)'
.0841
(.9327)
(continued page 17)
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Variable
DOHIO
DOREG
DSCAL
DSDAK
DTEXA
TIME*DCOM
SCALE*DCOM
GROWTH*DCOM
TABLE II (cont'd.)
REGRESSION RESULTS
Ecuatior. (1) Ecuacion (2)
-.1255
(-1.0045)
-.1742
(-1.4348)"^
-.0598
(-0.7741
-.0761
(-1.0222)
-.2205
(-1.2272)
-.1591
(-.9066)
-.1078
(-1.0243)
-.0402
(-.3932)
-.3975
(-2.3331)^
-.5275
(-3.1607)^
-.0035
(-.5121)
-.00002
(-5.0092)^
.4896
significant at 1 percent level
significant at 5 percent level
significant at 10 percent level
(2.3299)'
Standard error of estirate
N=350
.413
.1140
.456
.1055
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Equation (1) (Table II) shows that advertising increased by
9/100 of a mill per 1000 KWH for firms in competitive market structures
over those in monopoly market structures. Although this result reveals
an upward shift in the whole advertising function, it did not reflect
the effect, if any, that competition may have had on the slope coeffi-
cients of the individual variables. To estimate these interaction
effects, a variable was constructed for each non diunmy variable in
the basic equation by multiplying each by the competition dummy variable.
The results are shown in equation (2) of Table II, The results show
that competition not only shifts the advertising function upward but
it causes it to become steeper. An analysis of variance test (chow test)
40
revealed that the dummy variables should be included in the equation,
consequently, equation (2) is the equation of interest and the following
discussion refers to that equation.
The positive sign on the TIME variable reveals that advertising
intensity has increased through time, however, the variable is not
statistically significant at the ten percent level. These results were
not entirely unexpected because, as mentioned in the theoretical section,
there is no a priori basis for predicting the direction of the sign on
this variable. There are good reasons to expect sales promotion to
grow but equally strong reasons to expect a decline through time.
The positive sign on the SCALE variable reveals that larger monopoly
firms experience higher levels of advertising intensity than small firms.
This outcome would be expected from theory and the t statistic indicates
40
Computations of the statistical test may be obtained by
writing to the author.
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that this variable is significant at the one percent level. Inter-
estingly, however, the magnitude of the scale effects is extremely
small. That is, the coefficient is statistically significant but of
a very small value. The equation shows that promotionally intensity
increases only at the rate of .000005 mills per 1000 KWH of sales,
41
not a very large magnitude.
The sign on the GROWTH variable for monopoly firms is in the
correct direction according to theory. However, the coefficient is
42
not statistically significant to the ten percent level. One explana-
tion for this result is that growth for the monopoly firms in the sample
was not dramatic; given the nature of this industry, this is a real
possibility.
The competitive dummy variable is statistically significant at
the one percent level and this reveals that competitive firms engage
in more intense promotional activities than do monopoly electric utility
firms. The DOOM variable in equation (2) reveals that competition between
electric firms causes upward pressure on promotion expenditures in the
magnitude of .3512 per thousand kilowatt-hours
—
(approximately 4/10 of a
mill per 1000 kilowatt hours). As mentioned earlier, to fully assess
the effect of the DCOM variable on the slope coefficients of the indi-
vidual variables in the equation, interaction variables were constructed
by multiplying the DCOM variable by each other variable in the equation.
41
In effect, these results conform to those developed by John
Cable, "Market Structure, Advertising Policy and Intermarket Differences
in Advertising Intensity," in Market Structure and Corporate Behavior
,
K. Cowling (ed.), (London: Gray Mills, 1972).
42„
These results are consistent with those reported by Douglas
Greer, "Advertising and Market Concentration," Southern Economic Journal
,
July 1971, and John Cable, op. cit.
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except the state dummy variables. Table II, equation (2), shows that
both the SCALE*DCOM and the GROWTH*DCOM variables are statistically
significant at the one percent level. Consequently, they show that
advertising intensity is affected by interaction affects of both market
structure and scale and market structure and growth. In other words,
as the advertising function is shifted upward by competition, the slope
is changed by the effect of each of these variables. The time-market
structure effects are statistically insignificant so they do not need
to be considered further.
The full impact of conqietition on advertising intensity can be
determined by considering the interaction variables in addition to
the coefficient of the DCOM variable, developed in equation (2).
The interaction effects of DCOM and the GROWTH variable show
that there is no difference between monopoly and duopoly firms at
zero rates of growth in sales. However, as growth takes place, the
duopoly firms engage in more sales promotion activity causing the
expenditure for this purpose per KWH to increase. This behavior is
consistent with that discussed in the theory section. The difference
between the duopoly and the monopoly firms come from the fact that
in duopoly markets firms may gain at the expense of rivals, but in
monopoly markets, most of the potential buyers of the specific service
already buy from the monopolist. They have no choice. In the duopoly
case, the firm gains momentum from sales growth but in the monopoly
case this momentum does not develop. Brush points out that "... when
demand is growing rapidly, profits often rise faster than sales, and
to the extent that firms spend a part of these higher profits on
-21-
43
advertising, advertising intensity may be increased," The effects
mentioned by Brush are more likely to occur in a competitive market
than in a monopoly market, in the electric utility business.
The SCALE*DCOM interaction variable along with the SCALE variable
without interaction effects reveal very interesting results. A duopoly
firm of small size would spend more than a monopoly firm of the same
size. However, as scale increases, eventually the duopoly firm would
spend less and the monopoly firm would spend more per KWH sold. Inter-
estingly, the monopoly expenditures would increase only gradually
while the duopoly expenditures would fall off at a faster rate. These
results are caused by the nature of the firms and the environment in
which they compete. The monopoly firm would engage largely in institu-
tional or good will creating advertising which may originate more from
a feeling of responsbility by the business than for sales generating
purposes. The firm is a monopolist selling a product with a very low
price elasticity of demand. Consequently, larger monopolists have more
resources than smaller monopolists and spend slightly more for institu-
tional advertising.
In duopoly markets, however, the effects are substantially dif-
ferent. A duopoly firm must be more efficient and alert than a mono-
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polists and make better business decisions. They probably spend less
"^rian C. Brush, "The Influence of Market Structure on Industry
Advertising Intensity," The Journal of Industrial Economics , Vol. XXV,
No. 1, September 1976, p. 59.
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For a discussion of the effect of competition on costs in the
electric utility business see: Walter J. Primeaux, Jr., "A Reexamination
of the Jlonopoly Market Structure for Electric Utilities," in Promoting
Competition in Regulated Markets , Almarin Phillips (ed.), Washington, DC:
The Brookings Institution, 1975, pp. 175-200.
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on institutional types of advertising which does not yeild direct
economic benefit. Since they face rivalry, these firms may expand
sales volume by advertising and sales promotion activities. Con-
sequently, they would spend more for sales promotion per BCWH sold
than a monopolist at smaller output levels. However, as they grow
in size scale effects cause them to spend less per kilowatt hour,
because of diminishing returns to advertising. Large, protected
monopolists, on the other hand, maintained high promotion expendi-
tures per KWH in the face of declining marginal productivity of
advertising. Computations show that competitive firms spend more
than monopolists on sales promotion until 17,560 residential cus-
tomers are served. At that point, monopoly and duopoly firms spend
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the same amount. After achieving even larger size, the adver-
tising expenditure per KWH for the competitive firms fell below the
monopoly level. As mentioned above, competitive firms must scrutinze
the marginal productivity of advertising more closely than do monop-
olists.
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These size estimates are of limited general value. Estimations of
the point where the two values are equal and then where monopoly firms began
to spend more than competitive firms, can only be roughly approximated. For
one thing, in 1968, (the last year of data), the competitive subset contained
only two firms that had such a large number of customers, and the non-
competitive subset contained eight with such a large number of customers.
For another, since the crossover point is affected by both the estimated
slope and the estimated intercept of two functions, their equality can be
used only as a very rough approximation of the point where competitive
firms ceased to spend more on advertising than monopoly firms.
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Among those who explain that decreasing returns to advertising
should be expected are: Donald A. Hay and Derek J. Morris, Industrial
Economic Theory and Evidence, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, pp.
421-425 and 436-437; George Stigler, "The Economics of Information," The
Journal of Political Economy , Vol. LXIX, No. 3, June 1961, reprinted in
G. Stigler, The Organization of Industry
, Homewood: Richard D. Irwin,
1968, pp. 182-187; and Julian L. Simon, Issues in the Economics of Adver-
tising. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970, pp. 222-223.
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The dummy variables show differences in advertising intensity
across states for firms included in the sample. Michigan is the state
omitted from the equation, so the differences in magnitude are with
respect to the Michigan dummy variable.
VI. Conclusion
This analysis shows that advertising or promotional intensity
is increased by competition. Firms from monopoly markets, in the
electric utility indi;istry, incurred lower promotional expenditures
than did duopolists. Ducpolists expenditxires were higher by .3512
or approximately 4/10 of a mill per 1000 kilowatt hours. It seems
however, that monopoly firms spent more on promotion allowances
than the competitive firms after 17,560 residential customers are
served. These effects are caused by the nature of the industry and
the behavior of firms in their competitive environment. These esti-
mates, however, are of limited value because of the few competitive
firms in the sample achieving such a large scale of operations.
The data show that interaction effects of market structure and
growth are statistically significant. The results reveal that ad-
vertising for competitive firms increases at a greater rate than
monopoly advertising as growth occurs. The interaction variables
reveal that this relationship continues to hold at all growth
rates.
The welfare implications of these results are somewhat
difficult to assess. It would seem that economic welfare would
not be increased substantially if these advertising expenditures
were eliminated entirely. Although the sales promotion expenditures
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for mimicipal utilities averaged 1.1 percent of total revenue
from 1963 through 1968, competition and rivalry were obviously
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beneficial to the consumers in the duopoly markets. Perhaps
the real welfare implications relate to how the possiblity of ad-
vertising affects the dynamism of competition between two firms.
The fact that duopoly firms can get customers by advertising con-
tributes to the vitality of these markets and creates substantial
beneficial pricing effects for consiamers. The results, however,
cast serious doubt on the value of advertising by utility firms
in monopoly markets. Advertising levels are probably excessive
and not carefully controlled by management of the monopoly firms.
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One study examining the price effect of electric utility
competition is: Walter J. Primeaux, Jr., "Competition, Prices and
X-Efficiency," College of Commerce and Business Administration,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Faculty Working Paper
#521, October 13, 1978. This study found that prices of electricity
are lower with competition than in a monopoly market structure.
These price differences are substantial. The marginal price between
500 and 750 KWH blocks is lower by sixteen percent because of competi-
tion; the marginal price between the 750 and 1000 KWH blocks is
lower by nineteen percent because of competition; and the average
price (average revenue) is lower by thirty-three percent because of
competition. These results provide a measure of the effect of
monopoly on the prices consumers pay and permit an assessment of
the effect of competition as a regulator of utility rates.
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